Summary. This paper analyzes devaluations in a fixed exchange rate system by endogenizing both the speculation and devaluation decisions. It is shown that deterministic devaluation rules are generally sub-optimal for the central bank. In order to deter speculation the central bank introduces uncertainty into the timing of devaluation. The nature this mixed strategy is derived, as is the optimal strategy for speculators. The analysis allows an explanation of successful devaluations that are not precipitated by a speculative attacks, even under perfect capital mobility.
Introduction
A recurring problem with fixed exchange rate regimes is the need to periodically alter the exchange rate peg. This is a difficult problem for central banks because speculators will attempt to predict and exploit devaluations through their foreign currency purchases, creating the potential for an orderly devaluation to become a full-fledged exchange rate crisis. Moreover, foreign currency sold to speculators will either be lost or will have to be repurchased at the devalued exchange rate. In either case there is a strong incentive for the central bank to try to avoid a devaluation during a speculative attack by devaluing before the attack or, if it has sufficient reserves, riding out the attack and devaluing later. This paper analyzes this issue by endogenizing both the speculation and devaluation decisions. I show that deterministic devaluation rules are generally sub-optimal for the central bank. In order to deter speculation the central bank introduces uncertainty into the timing of devaluation. The nature this mixed strategy is derived, as is the optimal strategy for speculators.
The literature has extensively analyzed abandonments of fixed exchange rate systems. However, realignments in the fixed exchange rate regime have received relatively little analysis. In fact, realignments are more often observed than abandonments. For example, in their extensive study Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz find 101 devaluation or revaluations in the period 1959-93, as compared to 33 cases of fixed exchange rate abandonment.
Previous theoretical work examines realignments by analyzing only one side of the market. Either central bank behavior is taken as exogenous and the optimal speculator behavior is analyzed, or speculator behavior is taken as exogenous and optimal central bank behavior is analyzed. To my knowledge, this is the first paper that analyzes exchange rate realignments which endogenizes both central bank and speculator behavior.
Blanco and Garber (1986) started the line of research that analyzes realignments by studying speculator behavior, taking central bank strategies as exogenous. They extended the seminal work of Krugman (1979) and Salant and Henderson (1978) to incorporate devaluations rather than just fixed exchange rate abandonments.
1 Flood and Marion (1997a) take speculator behavior as exogenous and analyze the central bank's problem.
2 They show that in the absence of speculation the central bank's optimal realignment policy in an inflationary environment is given by an (S , s). The central bank fixes the nominal exchange rate and offers to buy and sell foreign currency at that rate. As time goes by, however, the fixed exchange rate leads to a real appreciation. Eventually, the real exchange rate appreciates to s, and the central bank devalues to the real exchange rate S, paying an adjustment cost to do so. The central bank then allows the real exchange rate to be eroded by inflation and then devalues again.
3 As the authors point out, such investigations are only applicable to countries that are enforcing perfect capital controls.
In the absence of perfect capital controls speculators will naturally attempt to predict the timing of the devaluation and purchase foreign currency prior to it. Thus, the optimum strategy for speculators depends on the behavior of the central bank. Likewise, the optimum strategy for the central bank depends on the behavior of speculators. The central bank has an incentive to avoid speculative attacks. Rather than simply choosing a critical level of fundamentals at which to devalue the exchange rate and accepting a speculative attack, the monetary
